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The current fear of most economists is that Britain and the 
major OECD economies are headed for 1970s-style stagflation, a bleak 
combination of low growth and high inflation. But, of these two evils, 
they proclaim inflation to be the worst. Fix inflation and growth will follow 
is the common current mantra, especially of the Bank of England and 
the European Central Bank. This view is not only wrong but also deeply 
dangerous. 
The 1970s ushered in the ‘monetarists’ revolt against Keynesianism, based, 
in part, on the fear of hyperinflation. But two points are crucial about 
inflation in the OECD countries in the 1970s and now.
First, no OECD country experienced anything approaching runaway 
inflation. While many large European economies went from single digit to 
double digit inflation for some years, inflation at its height reached only 25 
per cent in Britain (1975), only 19 per cent in Italy (1977), only 14 per cent 
in France (1974) and in no year reached even 10 per cent in Germany (see 
Table).
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So why are many economists worried if inflation is more than two per cent per 
year? The answer is that it hurts the financial sector. Bankers lose because the 
mortgages and other fixed-interest securities that they hold as assets lose their 
real value (see Irvin 2008).
In contrast, mild inflation (as opposed to double digit inflation) favours the 
majority of citizens. These include households who hold mortgages and 
many small businessmen who are in debt to banks. As long as government 
and the trade unions pursue a wages policy designed to prevent real wage 
erosion, mild inflation need not harm working class families. But because mild 
inflation erodes financial sector profits—and the financial sector has become 
increasingly important and politically vocal in the advanced economies—it is 
decried as the chief enemy.
Deflation: the real danger
Why is such monetarist orthodoxy positively dangerous in today’s climate? The 
US housing market has gone into freefall, financial market turbulence is rife and 
aggregate demand is contracting. A US recession is imminent, and could be 
prolonged. 
Moreover, the credit crunch has caused recession to spill over into Europe, 
whose core countries experienced zero or negative growth in the second 
quarter of 2008. In Britain, recession is expected in late 2008.  
During the mild recession of 2001, the US was running a budgetary surplus and 
thus could afford to loosen the fiscal reins. Today, however, the room for fiscal 
manoeuvre is far more limited. For example, at the member-state level, the 
Eurozone continues to call for fiscal restraint while at the supranational level, 
it has torpedoed a counter-cyclical fiscal policy by insisting that the annual 
budget be balanced. 
Hence, the danger for the OECD countries is not so much inflation as deflation, 
namely, falling prices along with declining incomes. Deflation was last 
experienced on a large scale in the USA and Europe in the 1930s. In Japan after 
1989, when the property bubble burst, incoherent economic policies virtually 
paralysed the economy, resulting in falling prices during much of the 1990s. 
The OECD’s latest projections suggest that the increases in food and fuel price 
rises will slow considerably in 2009, bringing overall inflation back below two 
per cent. If the rest of Europe exhibits macroeconomic trends similar to those 
in the US and Britain, the resulting recession could be longer and deeper than 
forecast. 
So the worst possible scenario for the world economy now is that excessive 
anti-inflationary zeal in the OECD will lead to Japanese-style deflation for the 
foreseeable future, namely, a falling price level along with negative growth.
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Secondly, today’s inflation is mainly imported through higher fuel and food 
prices. In the 1970s, the main OECD economies had stronger industrial 
sectors and better organised workers than is the case today, so imported 
inflation could turn into wage-push domestic inflation. 
Today the structural features facilitating double digit inflation 30 years ago 
have all but disappeared. In Britain, for example, the share of manufacturing 
in GDP has fallen from above 40 per cent in the 1970s to about 13 per cent 
today, while trade union membership has fallen from 13 to 7 million. More 
and more workers are employed in the low-wage service sector, or else are 
part-time or self-employed. 
Who loses from mild inflation?
Headline inflation (which includes food and other fluctuating prices) is 
currently running at around 3.5-4.0 per cent in the large industrialised 
countries. This is no higher than the average for the post-war boom years. 
Year US France Germany Italy UK
1971 4.4 5.6 5.1 4.8 9.2
1972 3.2 6.3 5.6 6.2 7.1
1973 6.2 7.1 7.0 10.2 9.4
1974 11.0 13.9 7.0 19.4 15.8
1975 9.1 11.7 6.0 17.1 24.5
1976 5.8 9.6 4.2 16.7 16.4
1977 6.5 9.6 3.6 19.3 15.8
1978 7.6 9.1 2.7 12.5 8.3
1979 11.3 0.6 4.2 15.5 13.5
